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vAbstract
making. The report shows that despite encourag-
ing changes and trends, there is still a significant
gap between the rhetoric of participation or IWRM
and reality on the ground. Debates between
stakeholders such as line agencies, politicians,
development banks, NGOs, consultants or user
associations are sometimes lively but often
limited to discursive struggles through the
media or publications. Many large-scale
projects with potential impact on large popula-
tions are still designed with little scrutiny, if not
in secrecy.
Tensions between local management and the
necessity to integrate uses at the basin level,
contradictions between top-down blueprint-based
state policies, the diversity/complexity of local
settings, conflicts between recommendations or
“best practices” drawn from global “toolboxes” and
stakeholders’ aspirations are pervasive. Enabling
governance structures for water management in
the Mekong region will be a journey towards
bridging these divides. The report is intended to
pave the way for further research on water
governance in the Mekong region and to flag
some major issues and topics for research.
In the past several years, water has moved up on
the agenda of most Mekong region countries.
This is due to recurring water shortages and
crises, to global initiatives and networking giving
greater public salience to water issues, and to the
persuasive insistence from development banks
pushing for reform of national water sectors.
This report documents current irrigation and
water policies in countries of the Mekong region.
It successively reviews planning issues, water
policies and legal frameworks, the setting up of
water policy “apex bodies,” participatory policies,
and Integrated Water Resource Management
(IWRM)/river basin management. It comments on
the underpinning of these policies, their discursive
dimension, and how they fit the reality of the
countries concerned. The review shows that most
ongoing and planned reforms borrow from “best
practices” alleged in international standards and
are insufficiently informed by local realities.
Planning of water resource development and
policies is still widely expert-driven and focused
on procedures and objectives, leaving little space
for the confrontation of values and for more
endogenous negotiated process of decision
1Irrigation and Water Policies in the Mekong Region:
Current Discourses and Practices
François Molle
Introduction
In the past several years, water has moved up on
the agenda of most countries in the Mekong
region. This is due to several interconnected
factors. First, recurring water shortages and
crises (scarcity, droughts, pollution, interstate or
intersectoral competition around the Mekong river,
etc.), although often local and temporary, have
instilled a sense of vulnerability. These shortages
have typically affected irrigation and, in some
cases, have also threatened urban supply (like in
Bangkok, in 1999, which experienced temporary
rationing in some areas). Second, numerous
global initiatives and networking focused on water
management (World Water Forums, GWP regional
activities, etc.) have also contributed to giving
water issues greater public salience. Third, these
initiatives have been paralleled by persuasive
insistence from development banks—most
notably the ADB and the World Bank—that
borrowing countries develop regulatory
frameworks, water policy, white papers and water
legislation. Fourth, there has been increasing
involvement of the private sector, notably in
hydropower generation and in urban water supply,
which has changed the situation of virtual state
monopoly over water resources.
Current policy initiatives have a lot in
common, partly because water-related problems
are broadly similar among countries and partly
because the initiatives stem from the mainstream
thinking and prescriptions—and sometimes fads
of the day—that come with the interventions of
development agencies. Water policy reform
processes generally contemplate a blend of the
following recommendations and measures:
• Poor water distribution in irrigation networks,
epitomized by classical efficiencies between
30 and 40 percent, is addressed by trying to
instill greater participation from users through
the design of service agreements in which
agency and farmers act as service provider
and clients, rather than as supplier and
recipients.
• Concern for cost-recovery and financial
sustainability generally leads to making
provision for the levying of a water charge.
• Embracing Integrated Water Resources
Management (IWRM) leads to putting
emphasis on river basin management that, in
turn, leads to proposals for River Basin
Organizations (RBOs), or other types of
interfaces between concerned line agencies
and users.
• The need to control uses and users of both
surface water and groundwater typically calls
for establishing a regime of water permits,
with registration of users, and sometimes
provisions for future formalization and trading
of these rights.
• The distinction between operation of the
hydraulic network, resources management,
and policymaking/regulation is emphasized
and leads to proposing three nested layers of
institutions with clear and distinct mandates.
2These trends in the water sector give rise to
several questions: how pressing was the need for
such reforms and how sound have been the
steps taken? To what degree have national
bureaucracies and ruling political parties shared
this concern for reordering the water sector and
added their will power to the solicitations of
outsiders, and how does this vary from country to
country? How do expectations from these formal
and state-centered initiatives compare with reality
on the ground? Are policies derived from
blueprints or based on a sound analysis of local
problems, and to what extent do top-down
approaches crowd out the emergence of
endogenous and condition-specific solutions?
More generally, what are the patterns of
governance emerging in the water sector, and
how do they shape policymaking, planning, and
management of water resources?
This report documents current irrigation and
water policies in the Mekong countries.1 It
successively reviews planning issues, water
policies and legal frameworks, the setting up of
water policy “apex bodies,” participatory policies,
and IWRM/river basin management. It comments
on the underpinning of these policies, their
discursive dimension, and how they fit the reality
of the countries concerned. The report is intended
to pave the way for further research on water
governance in the Mekong region2 and, as such,
its scope remains at a somewhat exploratory
level. Although the issue addressed here is
extremely vast and complex, and would require
the mobilization of a huge literature to be dealt
with in a comprehensive manner, it is hoped
that such a synthesis will enable one to flag
major current issues and orient the design of
research.
1China is mentioned but not dealt with in full detail because the diversity of situations warrants an extensive treatment beyond the
ambition of this report.
2In particular, it is meant to orient research of the Mekong Water Governance Network.
3Some dams planned several decades ago, such as the Nam Choan in the Mae Klong basin and the Kaeng Sua Ten on the Yom
river, have been successfully opposed by social activists and environmentalists.
Review of Main Irrigation and Water-Policy Development
Planning and Development of Water
Resources
The development of reservoirs and irrigation
schemes has been, and still is, prominent in the
Mekong region. The situation, however, differs
sharply according to the country. Thailand, China
and Vietnam have extensively developed their
irrigation infrastructure and investments have
declined in the last few years but hydropower
development is in full bloom (especially in
Vietnam and in the upper Mekong, China). Laos,
because of its scarce population, and Cambodia,
due to the war and political turmoil, and to some
extent Myanmar, still have a low degree of
infrastructural development, and options for the
future are subjects of debate (notably in the
Salaween river basin). The Mekong River
Commission (MRC) also devotes considerable
energy and budget to planning and development
of water resources.
According to Sethaputra et al. (2001)
Thailand’s irrigated area is around 30 million rai
(4.8 million ha), that is, approximately 20 percent
of the total farmland. Its dams can now store 70
billion cubic meters (Bm3) of water and most
major dam sites have been exploited.3 A number
of reservoirs are still under planning or
construction, but their typical size is around 250
million cubic meters (Mm3) and they face growing
3opposition from civil society, forcing the
Electricity Generation Authority of Thailand to
look for ventures and alternative sites in
neighboring countries (Hirsch 2001).
Neverthless, while it would seem that
Thailand has largely developed its water
resources and that the “hydraulic mission” is
coming to an end, further ambitious developments
seem to be on the way (despite the alleged
priority to demand-management announced in the
Ninth National Plan [2002–2006]). In July 2003,
the Royal Thai Government announced that it
would target 200 billion baht (US$5 billion) to
solve the problem of water scarcity in Thailand
and allow the irrigation of cultivable land not yet
supplied with water. The northeastern region was
to be the major beneficiary of the project
conceived as a part of the plan to “eradicate
poverty” in the country (see box 1).
Justifications for such large-scale
investments are usually raised by repeatedly
stressing the impact of droughts and floods and
by looking at the benefits of the projects alone,
disregarding costs. The Water Resource
Department at the Ministry of Natural Resources
and Environment (MNRE) estimated that 19,000
villages are facing a “chronic shortage of water”.
The National Economic and Social Development
Board also rang the alarm and produced
estimates of coming water shortages in Thailand
(Bangkok Post, 24 March 2004). Surveys by the
Ministry of Agriculture “found that floods hit an
average 9,300 villages a year, while about 35,000
villages were hit by drought. This caused billions
of baht in damages and lost income each year”
(Bangkok Post, 18 February 2004). Nothing is
said on how scarcity is defined, and on whether it
is a result of climatic variability or, perhaps, slack
management. These numbers are used to call for
the construction of new dams and other
infrastructure. Since irrigation areas tend to be
overdeveloped in relation to storage capacity, a
sense of scarcity is artificially created: “water
distribution doesn’t completely cover those
irrigation areas; we’ve lost a balance between
storage and distribution,” comments a high-level
official (Bangkok Post, 28 December 2003).
Focus on benefits rather than on cost/benefit
ratios was exemplified by the Prime Minister, who
was reported to say “it would not be a problem if
the (water grid) project required a lot of money
because it would be worthwhile eventually,” and
by the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the
project, who saw the project as “a worthwhile
investment because it will benefit 30 to 40 million
people nationwide” (The Nation, 23 June 2003).
Likewise, a statement by a Deputy Director of the
Irrigation Department shows that distributing water
is seen as an objective in itself, if not a mission:
“We know the problem… if water can’t be
distributed to people, maximum benefits will not
be attained” (Bangkok Post, 28 December 2003).
The gigantism and the ambition of the project
have been met with skepticism by many water
professionals and with dismay by
environmentalists (The Nation, 24 September
2004). It strains the imagination to envisage how
the irrigation area, which has been developed to
22 million rai in over one century, could be trebled
or more in 5 years. Much of the “irrigable” land of
the northeast is subject to salinity problems and
massive deliveries of water are likely to create
unprecedented environmental problems. Likewise,
it is not clear how sufficient labor could be
mobilized (Pednekar 1997), and whether markets
would be ready to absorb the resulting excess
production without collapsing. If one adds to this
the fact that only limited and costly additional
water is available in the country and that
transfers from international basins are highly
problematic, the project has yet to go through
several steps before proving to be a sound
investment.
From a governance point of view, the whole
process is characterized by secrecy, with only a
few contradictory statements being delivered to
the press. Despite the dramatic projected impact
on populations, livelihoods and the environment
(in terms of benefits, costs and externalities), no
participatory mechanism has so far been
observed. This contradicts the statement of
former Natural Resources and Environment
Minister Praphat Panyachartrak that “the public
will be allowed a much bigger say in state
4A power grid is the interconnected network of power generation and consumption nodes, which
allows spatial integration and balancing of production and use. This concept has been borrowed by
the water sector to describe as a “water grid” a project of interconnected reservoirs and basins
allowing the movement of water from sources to water-short areas. Of course, because of its bulky
nature, moving water is a much more expensive venture than moving electricity. Some examples of
such pressurized grids, or “carriers,” exist in small arid countries, such as Israel or Tunisia, but their
costs have generally prevented expanding the concept at a very large scale. Despite all this, the
Thaksin government announced in July 2003 that it would pursue a 200 billion4 baht ($5 billion)
venture to bring water to unirrigated farms, notably in the northeast, and help “turn Thailand into an
agricultural powerhouse” (The Nation, 14 September 2003).
Project targets are still ill-defined and contradictory but all point to a dramatic increase in
irrigated land. The current achievement of 22 million rai is contrasted with a total of 131 million rai
of cultivable land nationwide and gives way to all types of speculations. Several reports indicate
that “11 million rai would be fully irrigated, and that 25 million rai could be planted with crops that
require much less water than rice. Another 73 million rai would be irrigated for household
consumption and self-sufficiency in agriculture” (Bangkok Post, 3 May 2004), while “A nationwide
tap water system will be installed by 2005 so villagers and farmers throughout the country can
enjoy running water all year-round”.
A recent study by Khon Kaen University asserts that water will be provided to 60 million rai of
farmland and confirms that there is not enough water domestically and that “water diversion from
neighboring countries and international rivers is an essential part of the water grid project”
(Bangkok Post, 13 June 2004). In addition to that, according to a senior irrigation officer, “300 new
large and medium-sized reservoirs and 25,000 community reservoirs are needed to support the
project” (Bangkok Post, 03 May 2004).
The Prime Minister was reported to “believe northeastern provinces have enough water
resources and the problem is the irrigation and distribution system, which needs to be improved”
and had instructed the “Irrigation Department to fix the lack of water in Isaan provinces and report to
him on ways to solve the problem within one month (The Nation 24, April 2004). According to a
professor at Khon Kaen University involved in the feasibility study, the delay in the project was “the
result of a row between Natural Resources Minister Suvit Khunkitti and Agriculture Minister Somsak
Thepsuthin over who should oversee the project,” adding that “both ministers want to supervise the
project because it could be promoted in their election campaigns” (Bangkok Post, 13 June 2004).
Pilot projects worth US$1 million (40 million baht) are expected to be kick-started soon and will
consist of a diversion of Mae Klong water to Phetchaburi and Prachuap Khiri Khan. However,
according to the Minister of Natural Resources and Environment, “whatever the outcome of the pilot
projects, the government will finish all 13 schemes within five years” (Pinkaew 2004), which
suggests that “pilot project” is probably a misnomer.
Box 1: Thailand and the “water grid” project.
4The cost of the project fluctuates between 200 and 400 billion baht, depending on the official sources. Recently, the Prime Minister
pledged to set aside 100 billion baht “for solving water problems in the Northeast” (The Nation, 24 April 2004).
5development projects, which will also face
tougher scrutiny from a new agency” (Bangkok
Post, 13 February 2004); and, perhaps, provides
clues on the reasons for his ensuing eviction.
Vietnam is still involved in massive
investments for rural and water infrastructures.
The Red river and Mekong deltas require huge
outlays for works on dikes (flood protection) and
channels, notably the Mekong, with further
reclamation of land in the Plain of Reeds and
closing off of the seashore, allowing freshwater
irrigation during the dry season. Significant
investments are also being made in rehabilitation
and modernization, since most of the schemes
developed in the 60s and 70s are now in a
severe state of degradation (Tu n.d.; World Bank
20045). While he acknowledges that “so far, water
resources have received a big investment for
development,” Tiep (2002) reports that, on
average, existing irrigation systems supply water
to only 50-60 percent of the design command
area. Officials from the Ministry of Agriculture and
Rural development (MARD) justify further
investments by stressing that since “agriculture
provides about a quarter of Vietnam’s GDP and
exports and employs two-thirds of the labor force,
further crop diversification and increases in
productivity require modern hydraulic
infrastructure and more efficient delivery of
irrigation and drainage services” (World Bank
2004). This objective is couched in slightly
different terms by the World Bank (2004),
which sees its recent loan of $158 million to
the country as a “help [to] farmers with small-
scale irrigation schemes, who just came out of
poverty to build on the gains made in 1990s”
and a support to “key elements of Vietnam’s
Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth
Strategy”.
The area of irrigated land is currently around
3 million hectares, out of 7.4 million hectares
cultivated. According to Tiep (2002), water used
for agriculture was 47 Bm3 in 1990 and increased
to 61 Bm3 in 2000.6 Average demand increases 3
percent per year and “requirements” for 2010 are
estimated at 74 Bm3 (Tu n.d.). Other large
investments are made in the dam sector, mostly
for purposes of energy generation (Song Da on
the Black river, in the north-west, and Mekong
tributaries flowing westward into Cambodia). In
1999, the share of hydroelectricity in total power
production nationwide was 59 percent (Luc n.d.)
and several dams were being planned or built,
and added to the 743 large and medium
reservoirs of the country (Tiep 2002). The supply
of drinking water and sanitation to an additional
population of one million (mostly in the highland)
has also been made a priority. In sum, while
official priority is placed on rehabilitation and
modernization of existing infrastructure, the
importance of agriculture in Vietnam’s economy,
poverty alleviation and food security is likely to
spur continuing massive investments in dams
and water-control structures.
In Cambodia, water policy as a whole and
irrigation in particular are seen as crucial
elements of the development of agriculture,
leading to food security and poverty alleviation,
the main objectives pursued by the state in a
country where agriculture amounts to half of the
gross domestic product (GDP) and 90 percent of
employment (Sinath 2001). Less than 1 percent
of Cambodia’s water is diverted and only 200,000
hectares (16 percent of the total cultivated area)
are irrigated. The country counts only one
medium-scale dam for hydroelectricity. During the
Khmer Rouge period, numerous schemes
composed of dikes serving as reservoirs and of
crude canals crisscrossing paddylands were built
but most of them have been destroyed and can
only be transformed to efficient schemes with
considerable redevelopment.
5“Vice Minister Giang said that one of the Government’s current priorities is investing in the rehabilitation and upgrade of degraded
irrigation systems, which function poorly. A lot of systems were built tens of years ago and cannot handle current demands”.
6It is not known how this very high figure is arrived at but there is clearly a difficulty in defining “water use” (diverted) in agriculture in
the Mekong river delta.
6In other words, Cambodia is presumably only
at the beginning of substantial investments in the
water sector. The main debate revolves around
whether priority should be given to the
development of small-scale water resources or to
conventional large-scale irrigation schemes. The
former offers the prospect of a shortcut to
“progress” but past experiences show that
managerial capacity is lacking for schemes that
have, on average, quite a low economic return.
Öjendal (2000) makes the case for small-scale
and participatory projects based on
decentralization of rights, means and
responsibilities, as a way to reinforce local
authorities and democracy and to lessen
vulnerability. According to Sinath (2003), the
2001–2005 Rehabilitation and Development Plan
prepared by the Ministry of Water Resources and
Meteorology (MOWRAM) included 874 projects7 at
a total cost of US$600 million (gravity or pumping
irrigation schemes, repairs to dikes, reservoirs
and canals, etc.). Although not so large in
absolute terms, given the importance of the
agriculture sector for the country, these
investments will continue to rely heavily on
forthcoming loans and grants from international
banks and donors (MOWRAM and ADB 2001).8
Laos exhibits a similar low level of
investment/infrastructure that contrasts with the
fact that the agriculture sector provides the
largest share of foreign currency income (40
percent), about 52 percent of the GDP, and 85.5
percent of employment. The Water Vision for the
country stresses that “The national economic
development process is to be based on the
wealth of natural resources, especially water and
water resources,” which includes in particular
irrigation and hydropower (Phonechaleun et al.
2002). Significant improvements have been
achieved in the agriculture sector, with an
increase in dry-season rice area from 2,700
hectares in 1976 to 110,000 hectares in 2000,9
and irrigation shifting the average rice yield from
1.43 t/ha (rain-fed) to 3.27 t/ha during the same
period. Hydropower production is still low, i.e., 2
percent of a “potential” estimated at 30,000
megawatts. Development of hydropower dams
has been subject to intense environmental debate
and lobbying by NGOs and activists from outside
Laos, as epitomised in the Nam Theun II dam
controversy.
In 1999/2000, there were 19,170 irrigation
schemes with a service area of about 295,000
hectares in the wet season, a number still rising
due to heavy investment in the National Pump
Installation Management Project (NPIMP), mostly
along the Mekong river in the southern part of the
country (Khamhung 2001). Most irrigation
schemes, however, are based on traditional weirs
and can be found in the northern and central
regions. Large-scale public schemes are confined
to the main valleys, notably the Nam Ngum
valley near Vientiane, which has a reservoir with
a capacity of 7 Bm3. Oddly enough, it seems that
irrigation is taken as a measure of the level of
development or modernization. The (ambitious,
but somewhat virtual) targets set in 2001 were to
increase irrigation schemes from an actual
coverage of 36 percent of the agricultural land to
50 percent in 2005, and 80 percent in 2020, with
50 percent of the area cropped in the dry season!
(Phonechaleun et al. 2002). New investments,
including large dams, are contingent upon loans
by development banks and private-sector
involvement, both explicitly welcomed by the
government (Richardson 2002).
China’s water economy has long been
dominated by a strong engineering approach, but
significant efforts are being made towards
accommodating new concepts of environmental
7Many consist in rehabilitating the disastrous Khmer Rouge era irrigation works that were often laid out on a grid pattern rather than
being built according to natural land features.
8MOWRAM’s current financial resources only ensure (very low) staff salaries and 10 percent of needed operation and maintenance
(O&M) funds (MOWRAM and ADB 2001).
9Numbers given by Khamhung (2001) differ: “The irrigation area in dry season has rapidly increased from 29,000 ha in 1996 to
197,000 ha in 2000.” This increase has mostly been based on pump irrigation.
7sustainability, demand management, rational
pricing and institutional power-sharing (Boxer
2001). Although construction-based policies have
decreased in importance, in the past years China
has been a focus in the global news because of
two major projects: the Three Gorges dam and
the south-north diversion, which diverts water
from the Yangtze to the Yellow river (Berkoff
2003). This project includes three transfer canals
that are expected to inject 50 Bm3 into the Yellow
river basin (see box 2). Dam construction on the
upper Mekong course has perhaps been less
publicized but has stirred debate on their current
and future impact.
Water Policy and Water Laws
In past years, the Mekong region has witnessed
several initiatives aimed at updating and
strengthening national water laws and regulations.
China enacted its first water law in 1988, which
was revised in 2002. Laos and Vietnam had laws
passed in 1996 and 1998, respectively, while
Cambodia’s draft is to be soon examined by the
Parliament. Thailand has been considering
several versions of a Water Law over the past 15
years or so but the process still continues. These
legal documents and related decrees have often
been designed with significant contributions from
foreign consultants hired by the World Bank, ADB
or FAO. As such, they invariably borrow from a
corpus of issues and strategies seen as “best
practices” or “modern”10 international standards,
sometimes overlooking local constraints or
specificities. Even where the role of foreign
consultants has been more modest, as in China,
a new generation of water specialists has
reportedly embraced what is seen by Boxer
(2002) as “internationally accepted strategies and
methods”.11 Recurring features include the
separation of the water regulation, management
10The introductory note of the Cambodian draft stresses that the document was “well conceived, in line with modern trends in water
resources management” (KOC 2002).
11Ideas are “propagated by a new generation of economists and engineers, many foreign-trained, who avidly seek to address China’s
water problems by applying internationally accepted strategies and methods. On the other hand, these externally generated policy
initiatives must make sense in Chinese terms. This means that they must be made workable in the context of an ongoing, self-
directed and spirited effort by the Chinese water engineering and science community to redefine conceptual, technological and social
rationales for environmentally significant water policies spawned by the economic, political and ideological conflicts of the last half
century” (Boxer 2002).
The south-north transfer project includes three different routes (the east, middle and west routes)
that are to interlink the Yangtze river (which has relative “surplus” water) and the Yellow river (which
is severely overcommitted). The North China plain is home to a population of over 300 million and
is undergoing critical water scarcity, with the common patterns of declining aquifers, reduced
allocation to agriculture, shortages in supply to cities and severe environmental problems of
pollution and siltation. The first phase aiming at the diversion of 20 Bm3 has started, with an
estimated cost of $17 billion and the likely displacement of 300,000 people.
Although the environmental and economic dimensions of the project are not attractive, political
and pragmatic arguments are likely to prevail. At stake is the alleviation of the enormous stress
distributed between agriculture, cities and, last but not least, the environment in a region with high
population densities and booming economic development.
Box 2. The south-north transfer project in China (drawn from Shao et al.
2003; Berkoff 2003).
8and service provision functions (with, in particular,
the establishment of an apex body); definition of
permits for water use; mechanisms for cost-
sharing; watershed management; polluter-pays
principle; and emphasis on participatory and
integrated land and water resources
management—these two latter issues are
examined in more detail in the next sections.
In Laos, the Water Resources Law and the
Environmental Protection Law were passed in
1996 and 1999, respectively, and some ministerial
decrees and regulations have been approved
recently. The Water Law has 10 provisions and
49 articles focusing on the protection of water
resources and watersheds, and water resources
planning and prevention of water pollution
(Khamhung 2001). An apex body, the Water
Resources Coordination Committee (WRCC) was
established in 1999 within the Prime Minister’s
Office, with the active support of the ADB
(Khamhung 2001). The law includes some vague
provisions for the establishment of water use
permits. While supporting the idea in general
terms, Pheddara (2003) lists some questions that
would be faced by the legislator: he raises doubts
on the capacity of the administration to handle
issues of definition, application and registration of
rights, to ensure publication of applications and
handling of objections/conflicts, and conformity
with hydrological reality, let alone questions of
monitoring and enforcement, all this in a country
where water use and allocation conflicts are still
very limited. There has been little domestic
discussion or awareness of the law and its
implications and no civil society input into the
policy process.
In Cambodia, a first draft was issued in 1999,
one year after the establishment of the Ministry
of Water Resources and Meteorology
(MOWRAM), and revised in 2001. It failed to be
examined before the political stalemate of 2003
and is expected to be considered when the
national parliament reassembles. While one
cannot prejudge what adjustments are going to be
made,12 the draft puts emphasis on several
principles (KOC 2001): Article 9 stipulates that
“the diversion, abstraction and use of water
resources for purposes other than those
mentioned in Article 8 [domestic uses and
gardening], and the construction of the
waterworks relating thereto, are subject to a
license by the MOWRAM”. These licenses “may
be transferred by its holder to another user,
whether totally or in part, subject to the prior
approval of MOWRAM” (Article 13) and will be
granted against a water fee. Accordingly,
MOWRAM will keep and update a “centralized
inventory of the water resources of The Kingdom
of Cambodia”13 and will also “record all water use
and wastewater discharge licenses”. To avoid the
embarrassment of attempting to set up licenses
for the whole country at once, the law entitles
MOWRAM to declare a Water Law
Implementation Area corresponding to a basin,
subbasin or aquifer, where specific regulation is
needed. Given the very low level of water
abstraction in Cambodia, this measure is likely to
remain dormant for quite a long period. In any
case, excessive faith in the state capacity to
regulate and reorder water use generally leads to
some disappointment (see, for example, the
logistical nightmare experienced in the two pilot
basins of Tanzania [van Koppen 2002]). Beyond
granting the state the power to exact water fees
from users, it is not clear why such a complex
device is recommended in a context where
allocation conflicts are hardly an issue and
hydrological measurements are almost nil. The
draft water policy indulges in the heroic
assumption that fees are “necessary to conserve
the water resource, and administer them in a
consistent and timely manner” (KOC 2002) but
12The 2002 draft has been translated in Khmer and is to be submitted to the cabinet, the parliament, the senate and the king before
being translated back to English after its approval. This “black box” process ensures the appropriation of the law by national decision
makers, but sometimes also harbours some surprises, as was observed with the earlier fisheries and forest law.
13“This inventory shall indicate the location, quantity and quality of the resources during the year, each year,” a Herculean task that
seems to ignore the current poor status of data/knowledge of the overall hydrology in the country.
9such an assertion seems little more than lip
service to mainstream thinking.
The recent Strategy and Action Plan (KOC
2004) also includes a number of general
statements,14 defines its goals in a very broad
manner,15 and outlines strategies rather than a
clear work plan with steps and targets, in part
because the lack of budget and dependence on
external funds makes it difficult to plan activities.
In the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis,
Thailand obtained a $600 million loan from both
the ADB and JBIC under the name of ASPL
(Agriculture Sector Program Loan), conditional
upon acceptance of some principles and a reform
of the water sector (RWS). A policy-matrix was
defined, showing commitment and successive
milestones to be achieved. The RWS was
designed by consultants to the ADB and issued
in March 2001. It included several components
(Halcrow et al. 2001), including the following:
• Strengthening of the Office of the National
Water Resources Committee (ONWRC) and
its transformation into an apex body
• Decentralization of water management to river
basins
• Watershed protection strategy
• Setting of performance indicators and service
standards
• Participatory irrigation management and
definition of farmers as clients of a service
rather than beneficiaries
• Cost sharing of operation and maintenance
(O&M).
• Reorganization, decentralization and
privatization of the Royal Irrigation
Department
In parallel, the National Water Resource
Committee worked on the draft Water Law16 (that
has been revised several times during the past
years), which was supposed to encapsulate many
of the crucial aspects of this ambitious reform,
notably the establishment of River Basin
Committees (RBCs), and the separation of the
policy, management and O&M functions.
The reform process initiated under the ASPL
has been phased out during 2002 and 2003, at
the behest of the new Prime Minister. Pilot
projects have been implemented partially and
without supervision, leading to no real change.
Cost-sharing policies and service agreements
have disappeared from the front scene. The draft
Water Law is still in limbo. The restructuring of
RID has been limited to measures such as the
non-replacement of retiring staff.17 Only the
setting up of RBCs has continued as planned,
under the guidance of the ONWRC (now the
Department of Water Resource of the MNRE). At
present, however, they still lack the formal
recognition that would give them a role beyond
that of a mere consultative forum. In balance,
although the reform process built in the ASPL
was in general sound on paper, it suffered from
being introduced through loan conditionalities,
14“Because of increasing population and socioeconomic development, the demand for water also is increasing rapidly, and there is
very strong pressure on the Nation’s water resources”. Likewise, sectoral allocation between agriculture, energy, industry, domestic
use, navigation, tourism, fisheries and ecosystem maintenance, a problem typical of basins with high competition over resources, is
deemed to be addressed, as “water distribution needs to balance the requirements of all these sectors, so that water is used to the
greatest total national benefit” (KOC 2004).
15“To manage and develop water resources in an effective, sustainable and equitable manner, to protect ecosystems and to reduce
the effects of water-related hazards such as floods and droughts on people’s lives and public property” (KOC 2004).
16A 1997 draft emphasizes the officialization of a National Water Resources Committee (NWRC) and its secretariat, the Office of the
National Water Resources Committee (ONWRC); the “appointment” of River Basin Committees (RBCs), the establishment of Water
Users groups, provision for droughts and flood protection, the definition of water user fees by the RBCs, and penal provisions.
17The RID is a very strong line agency, which initially looked after hydrological data, irrigation design, construction, O&M, the production
of electric power, cement and fertilizer, and ran its own experimental stations: it was described by Hirschman (1967) as a “kingdom
within a kingdom”. Although it later lost significant power to the Electricity Generation Authority of Thailand (EGAT) and the Department
of Energy Development and Promotion (DEDP), and recently had to adjust to the establishment of the Ministry of Natural Resources
and Environment (MNRE), it remains a powerful agency within the Thai government.
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without paying enough attention to the
acceptance or preparedness of the bureaucracy
and of the political leaders, as well as of civil
society (which, for example, vehemently opposed
conditionalities over water pricing). Involvement of
the latter was minimal, although some
stakeholder analyses and workshops were carried
out by academics hired by the ADB. The case of
the community forestry bill provides an example
where input from nongovernmental entities and
the debate have been intense (box 3).
The 1999 Vietnamese law vests all power in
the state and “State agencies, economic
organizations, political organizations, People’s
Army Forces units and all individuals in the
protection, exploitation and use of the water
resource: prevent combat and overcome the
harmful effects of water (introduction) … have the
responsibility to implement legislation on water
resources” (Article 4). “The People’s Committees
at all levels and the competent State
organizations” are entrusted with most of the
tasks, from planning, regulation, emergency
works, implementation, to control and
management. The law introduces the user-pays
and polluter-pays principles. Users must register
and get a permit from the competent State
agencies, except for “small-scale [use] for the
family in agricultural, forestry production,
aquaculture, small industry and handicraft
production, hydropower generation and other
purposes” (Article 24). The law reviews in
detail and prohibits a large number of actions
that are “harmful to water resources and their
quality”.
In 2001, the government set up the National
Water Resource Council and there is also some
provision for basin management, although little
detail. What is clear from both the law and
documents emanating from high-ranking officials
is the absolute control of water issues by the
state apparatus: Article 61 of the law, for
example, refers to the “unified and concentrated
managerial right of the Government;” under the
18But this principle has been a principle of Chinese irrigation (as well as Vietnam’s) for many years dating back to the 1960s.
title “Direction for unified and integrated
management of water resources,” the first and
main heading given by Luc (n.d.), is, tellingly:
“Strengthen the system of organization and
management of water resources from central to
local levels”.
China’s 1988 Water Law was meant to serve
as a regulatory framework for rationalizing water
use in a context of transition to a market
economy (AIRC 2003). The law includes the user-
pays principle18 and compensations for third-party
impact in case of flow alteration but often reads
like a policy document since application is left to
subsequent decrees. The 2002 revamp of the law
draws on the 1988 act but gives greater
emphasis to themes such as conservation,
environmental preservation and allocation by
quota. The major issue of river basin
development and management is also given more
salience (Shen 2004) but largely remains a matter
of bureaucratic and centralized planning.
Boxer (2001, 2002) ascribes the slow pace of
reforms to variable and uncertain physical
endowments, to the speed of economic changes
which are taking place and to the continuing
prominence of the MWR—the promoter of the law
and also the longstanding central and main player
in the water sector. However, the law provides for
a relatively high degree of autonomy to local
authorities (Saleth and Dinar 2000b), and several
experiments with bulk water allocation and pricing
(Mollinga et al. 2003) and intersectoral
reallocation of water rights (Fu and Hu 2002), for
example, are reported. Local administrative units,
notably provinces (such as Yunnan, which has its
own dam agenda), prefectures and county
governments all have Water Resources Bureaus
with quite a large latitude for water management.
Reviewing such experiences is beyond the scope
of this report but the (still limited) literature
suggests that there is a rather high diversity of
situations and experimentations (Lohmar et al.
2003) from which it is hard to derive general
conclusions.
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The rise of environmentalism in Thailand has coalesced around a few struggles against dams,
pollution threats, deforestation or afforestation, in which the state widely resorted to the use of
coercive means and manipulation of media campaigns (Hirsch and Lohmann 1989). The conflict
between development and environmentalism is still strongly sensed by leading government
agencies. However, the percolation of environmental ideas into Bangkok elites and the idealization
of a premodern past where community values and nature (thammatchat) fused together (Rigg and
Ritchie 2002), contributed to mainstreaming ideas about the vulnerability of both nature and
humankind and to the realization that abusing the former will impact on the latter (Nickum and
Rambo 2003).
The perception or construction of forests as reserves of biodiversity, carbon sinks or regulating
sponges, has unleashed a logic of conservation anchored in Buddhist principles and endorsed by
urban elites that is potentially damaging for local communities that live in forest resources
(Contreras 2001). NGOs and sympathetic academics have counterbalanced the negative stereotype
of hill-tribe communities, emphasizing their traditional knowledge and wisdom and promoting their
image as legitimate custodians of upland environments (Trakarnsuphakorn 2003) at the risk,
however, of undermining their position as consumers of the resources (land, water and forests)
(Walker 2002).
The development of the community forestry bill is believed to reflect the increasing weight of
civil society actors and the politicization of stakeholders who were previously marginalized
(Contreras 2001). The bill is the first piece of legislation to originate from NGOs through a petition of
more than 50,000 signatures, as allowed by the new 1997 constitution (Sato 2003). It has gone
through a lengthy process of successive revisions, which has allowed the inclusion of views by
NGOs and the civil society. The debate hinges on the crucial question of whether forests must be
protected by the people, or from the people and this has proved to be a divisive line both among
civil society groups and key agencies, such as the Royal Forestry Department and the Agricultural
Land Reform Office (Sato 2003; Johnson and Forsyth 2002). At stake are the use of public
forestland by current forest dwellers and the classification of different types of conservation areas
and sanctuaries, including the division between forests and degraded forests, the latter being able
to be transformed into agricultural land (Roth 2004).
The bill has not yet been adopted and what its final content will be is still unclear. It even
seems that the process has been stalled in the last 2 years. The potential importance of the bill in
securing access rights for marginalized populations can already be sensed by the impressive
growth of community forestry, advocacy groups and petitions for rights (Johnson and Forsyth 2002).
Box 3. The Thai community forestry bill and the civil society.
12
Myanmar has not yet considered updating
any of its laws related to water. However, as part
of its recent effort to define a National Water
Vision to Action, it is considering working on “a
unified water resources law so as to promote a
more effective legal framework for coordination
and management of water resources” and
establishing a national water authority (Ti and
Facon 2004).
Pressure from external agencies to pass
water acts have tended to generate a process
whereby these laws are watered down, leave
state control intact or increased, pay lip service
to the fads of the day (Biswas 2001; Jonch-
Clausen and Fugl 2001), and need further decrees
to be put into action.19 Phonechaleun et al. (2002)
emphasize “the urgent necessity to implement
laws, decrees, regulations for integrated and
sustainable management and development of
water resources,” but admit “that the enforcement
of the Water and Water Resources Law and
related regulations [in Laos] is still very weak”.20
Pheddara (2003) notes the Government of Lao
PDR’s “enthusiasm in developing legal and
regulatory framework”. Indeed, laws on water,
electricity, forestry, mining, land, agriculture, and
environment protection have been issued between
1996 and 1999 at the instigation of the ADB and
other external organizations. One may wonder
whether such feverish legislative activity is useful
or not. Pessimists argue that the regulation
established is wholly inadequate, at best
innocuous and at worst counterproductive,
echoing Ostrom’s (2000) warning that “the worst
of all worlds may be one where external
authorities impose rules but are only able to
achieve weak monitoring and sanctioning”:
optimists tend to retort that despite the idealized
view enshrined in the laws, these have to be
seen as a set of principles meant to underpin
future decisions and policies over a long time
period. To be sure, both tend to overestimate the
power of the state to control the water regime.
The emphasis on law reflects an underlying
belief that it can effectively act as a “social glue
and ordering mechanism… making visible the
contours of relatively stable authorized rules that
are enforced by legitimate procedures for the
maintenance of social order” (Mehta et al. 2000).
In other words, legalistic approaches provide a
reassuring illusion that messiness and
unpredictability will be circumscribed and
stabilized. The power and effectiveness of laws
are, of course, contingent upon the control that
the state is able to exert on local realities, in
particular its enforcement capacity. This is not to
argue that laws are not needed but, rather, to
draw attention to the fact that legalistic
approaches may often be some type of self-
delusion in disguise, whereby one denies the
messiness of the world by assuming it will/can be
controlled, while impeding a deeper understanding
of this “messiness,” the recognition of its role in
strengthening resilience, and hindering attempts
to factor it in process-based approaches.
Institutional reform processes equated to
policy and law formulation tend to be highly
prescriptive, presenting models for desired end
stages and listing policy recommendations
(Mollinga 2001). They rest on static21 and
managerial views of the world that deny
heterogeneity and uncertainty (Mehta et al. 2000)
and leave little room for flexibility and stakeholder
inclusion.
19As reported by Malano et al. (1999), the Vietnamese Water Law states general principles but provides no details on the modalities
of their application. This will meet development banks’ conditionalities for further funding in the water sector, while possibly deferring
concrete actions for an indeterminate period of time. China’s laws, too, leave application modalities to be defined by ulterior decrees.
20This is echoed by Pheddara (2003), who sees “an urgent need for the development of further legislation or decrees for sub-sectoral
activities; as well as the necessary legal documents to accompany the Law and make it effective”.
21A similar static and bureaucratic view of river basin management appears graphically in IWMI (2003), where “right” policies, laws and
administration are the three “pillars” supporting the temple: “sharing river basin water resources”.
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Apex Bodies and Three-Tier
Institutional Design
Apex bodies are intended to advise governments
and improve coordination between the various
water-related sectors and ministries (Birch 2004).
They have emerged recently as part of what
Wright (1999) sees as “modern water
management arrangements” to separate as much
as possible the three complementary roles that
constitute water management:
• Standard setter and auditor/reporter (apex
policy body)
• Water resources manager or regulator
• Water operator (for example, irrigation
providers or water-supply utilities)
In Asia, apex bodies have been promoted as
a “best practice” by the ADB,22 which has
systematically supported the inclusion of a three-
tier structure in national water policy reforms.
According to Birch (2004), the focus of apex
bodies is at the interministerial level and they are
meant to influence national debates and reforms,
instilling a degree of IWRM thinking and practice
into decision making. ADB advocates that apex
bodies “are needed in the developing countries of
Asia to bring together government, civil society
and nongovernment stakeholders to promote
effective water policies and guide national water
sector reforms” (Arriens 2004), although it is not
clear how interministerial committees can achieve
much participation of civil society.23
One reason that apex bodies proposed by the
ADB are relatively well accepted by the different
countries might be that they understand the need
to improve coordination and overall decision
making in issues related to water resources. Yet,
setting up such bodies, which are intended to be
committees, not operational entities, does not
automatically ensure that they will have a strong
influence over water issues. Initially at least, they
are likely to either remain largely cosmetic, or to
appear as a threat to irrigation and other
agencies, especially if they try to influence
decisions in a way perceived as detrimental by
these agencies. These bodies are, in general, a
emanation of the higher levels of the bureaucracy
and as such unlikely to preside over a drastic
redistribution of power.
In Laos, the Water Resources Coordination
Committee (WRCC) was established to “provide
advice to the government on matters related to
water and water resources and to coordinate the
planning management, follow-up, inspection and
protection of water and water resources aimed at
sustainable development and utilization of water
and water resources in line with the government
policy of socioeconomic development”
(Phonechaleun et al. 2002). In 2001, the
Vietnamese government set up the Vietnamese
National Water Resources Council (VNWRC), to
provide consultancy to the government “in the
important decisions on water resource that come
under the tasks and powers of the government”.
The VNWRC’s achievements have so far been
rather modest (Birch 2004; Lai 200224). In
22See http://www.adb.org/Water/NWSAB/default.asp: “ADB actively promotes and supports the development of national water sector
apex bodies to: (a) promote a national focus on water sector reform, through the formulation and adoption of effective national water
policies, water laws, improved institutional capacities, information management, and a national action agenda for the water sector; (b)
guide a water sector reform process in which the relevant stakeholders in the country collaborate to achieve agreed water sector
outcomes; and (c) facilitate policy dialogue and investment partnerships in the water sector with development partners, including
ADB”.
23The compositions of the apex bodies of Vietnam (Anonymous 2000b) and Laos (Anonymous 2000a) do not show any inclusion of
non-state participants. Arriens (2004) sees an initial role of apex bodies as “multi-stakeholder forum at the highest level”, which does
not accord with their composition, unless stakeholders are assumed to be limited to the state apparatus.
24An official report in 2002 on ONWRC (Lai 2002) states that “there is a perception that ONWRC is small and poorly supported… and
inactive”.
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Thailand, the ONWRC has been set up without
legal backing as part of the reforms instigated by
the ADB and the World Bank and its past record
is still modest. Despite the dedication of some
officials, the committee’s outreach is constrained
by limited staff and resources, and its lack of
power when dealing with long-established line
agencies. Birch (2004) acknowledges that apex
bodies must take a step-by-step approach and
gradually build their capacity and legitimacy, and
that they eventually critically depend on
leadership and on the existence of a “champion”
dedicated to pushing the new IWRM agenda.
The separation of the management/regulatory
and water provision roles is a much more touchy
issue because it meddles more deeply with the
existing distribution of power. Therefore, it is no
surprise that little, if any, progress is recorded on
this point. The management function is generally
being entrusted to Water Resource Management
Departments established in new ministries
responsible for natural resources or water as a
whole. This is the origin of MoNROE in Vietnam,
the MNRE in Thailand and, to some extent, of
the MOWRAM in Cambodia.25 So far, the
experience has been inconclusive because
powerful irrigation agencies have remained under
the Ministry of Agriculture in Thailand and the
MARD in Vietnam. The new Water Departments
have generally been staffed with individuals
transferred from the irrigation agencies, who then
found themselves in a delicate situation vis-à-vis
their professional communities of origin.26 From
an initial theoretical position whereby regulator
bodies were considered to be fully neutral and
independent, the ADB has now realized that
establishing such bodies has met with fierce
resistance from traditional line departments and
acknowledged that a more flexible approach was
preferable (Arriens 2004). Yet, regulators must
show qualities of efficiency, accountability and
transparency to build an image of credibility.
On balance, it is too early to draw
conclusions from these attempts to reorder roles
and responsibilities in the water sector. However,
regardless of whether the new concept is sound
or not, it has not yet proved to be effective and it
remains to be seen whether traditional structures
will accept and adapt to these changes. The
separation of roles has many benefits (Abernethy
2005) but it hinges on the assumption that water
management can be expressed in terms of
service agreements, abstraction licenses,
allocation rules, enforcement, etc., which is often
a far cry from the reality on the ground.
Participation and Turnover
The ideology and rhetoric of participation have
long infused development theory and practice
(Cleaver 1999; Nelson and Wright 1995). The
underpinning of the concept is that participation is
conducive to greater efficiency and equity in
management; that problems are better solved by
those who experience them, and that projects are
better maintained and more sustainable when
designed and taken care of by the direct
beneficiaries. Participation can be conceived as a
tool (for better management) or as a process
(with view to empowerment). In the water sector,
there have been repeated and widespread
attempts to replicate the traditional organizations
for water management, observed in small
communal systems (based on small tanks, run-
of-the-river diversions, springs and qanats),
adapting them to large-scale schemes.
Experiences with participatory irrigation
management (PIM) or management transfer
(turnover) have had mixed results (Vermillion
1997; Samad and Vermillion 1999; Kolavalli and
Brewer 1999; Meinzen-Dick et al. 1994), mostly
because of a lack of genuine farmer
empowerment and redistribution of roles, and of
25But Cambodia also has a Ministry of Environment (in addition to the Ministry of Agriculture and to the Ministry of Rural Development).
26In their new departments they are accused to be a “spy” of the irrigation agencies, while in these agencies they are considered as
“traitors”… [a RID official, name withheld].
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limitations in hydraulic infrastructure (Facon 2000,
2002).
In Cambodia, participation principles are
reaffirmed in the draft water policy in a
standardized and politically correct manner27 but
the main policy line is the transfer of small- and
medium-scale irrigation systems to Farmer Water
User Communities (FWUCs). A long-term program
called Participatory Irrigation Management and
Development (PIMD) has been launched by the
MOWRAM to establish FWUCs as legal entities
with the right to own irrigation systems, hold bank
accounts and enter into legally binding contracts.
They are to be responsible for the O&M of their
scheme; however, it is also clear that the
“essential principle of PIMD is cost sharing”
(Sinath 2003). After rehabilitation of the scheme
(if needed) the FWUCs are to collect a fee: this
is, initially, supported by the government, with a
participation that decreases each year by 20
percent, over a period of 5 years. This income is
to be reinjected into maintenance activities (that
still need the approval of the Ministry), while
possible surpluses can be used for collective
investments such as tractors, threshing machines,
pumps or seeds. The project is still at the initial
stage and includes setting up one pilot project in
each of the 22 provinces, while provincial teams
are trained to establish and assist FWUCs.
The PIMD is a top-down program where
farmers are considered as recipients of the
knowledge28 and advice of the administration and
experts, and are sometimes considered not to
fully understand the issues at stake.29 The
declared objective is “to catch the big benefits via
using the participatory approach to mobilize,
organize and explain to the farmers how important
are the FWUCs, the responsibility for further
O&M” and to instill a sense of ownership after
rehabilitation of the irrigated system (Sinath
2003). The challenge of the project is to build up
mechanisms of financial sustainability at the
scheme level to avoid recurrent state
expenditures or rapid deterioration of
infrastructures. Several other similar initiatives
have been launched by different NGOs (Roux
2004). Cambodia, at first sight, offers an
interesting example of a contradiction between
the global participative rhetoric used in many
development projects and a sociocultural context
that is considered by anthropologists and political
scientists as the least amenable to such ideals
(Chandler 1996; Ovesen et al. 1996; Giovalucchi
2003): the social structure is reputedly loose, with
an all-pervasive notion of hierarchy and a strong
control by the state on local life; communal work
is associated with forced collective labor; marked
inequalities and lack of personal security foster
traditional patron-client relationships, etc., but
these facts are hardly taken into consideration to
adjust policies and interventions to the
Cambodian context.30
27One of the policies is “To promote and facilitate the participation of private investors, stakeholders, beneficiaries, NGOs, and
International Organizations, especially women, the landless, and other disadvantaged people, in planning and management of water
resources” (KOC 2002).
28“The FWUCs must receive training on all aspects of water management, including the crop water requirements, frequency of irrigation,
water distribution, some idea of how important are participatory irrigation management, irrigation management transfer, and the national
policy for FWUCs from the multi-disciplinary support team for FWUCs assisted by the external FWUC experts” (Sinath 2003). If the
external intervention can be beneficial for setting mechanisms of fee collection and management, it is doubtful whether farmers will
have much to learn on how to manage water under local conditions.
29“Some farmers who are members of the FWUCs do not yet understand the conceptualization and exercises of FWUCs, PIMD, and
the policy reform in the irrigation sector, causing some FWUCs to not function well and local investments are not used” (Sinath 2003).
30See Ovesen et al. (1996): “The all-pervasive guiding principle for Khmer social life is the notion of hierarchy. All social relations are
hierarchically ordered. The hierarchy is primarily expressed in terms of age…The social order is felt to depend upon everybody observing
this status hierarchy and keeping his/her place in it”. And also: “Certain political conditions are especially conducive to the existence
and promotion of systems of patron-client relations. These conditions are the persistence of marked inequalities of wealth, status and
power, which are afforded a certain legitimacy; the relative absence of effective impersonal guarantees such as public law for physical
security, property and position; and the inability of either kinship units or traditional village community to serve as effective vehicles of
personal security or advancement. It is hard to think of a country that fits these conditions as well as Cambodia”.
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The state-centered Law of Vietnam is
parsimonious with regard to participation. It
contains 71 occurrences of “state,” 49 of
“Government,” but none of “participation” or
“participatory”. This can be attributed to the
particular conception that people are effectively
represented by local People’s Committees and
other official organizations. This may appear as a
practical way to sideline civil society but such
conception is also genuinely ingrained in local
political discourse and culture, and the writers of
the law did not feel the necessity to pepper its
articles with participative rhetoric. In that sense,
the notion of “civil society” is redundant. It is
abundantly clear from official documents that the
statement: “involvement of stakeholders is
important for integrated water resources
management” (Lai 2002) refers to the involvement
of all ministries and provinces concerned.
Likewise, China’s water laws also make no
mention of participation other than that of the
concerned department and layers of the
bureaucracy. The concept of civil society is
absent and the same conception of people
represented by their administration prevails.
In Laos, new policies are said to include “fully
decentralized ‘bottom-up’ participatory planning
with the governmental system” (Khamhung 2001)
but there is little sign that this translates to giving
people more say on, for example, the large
infrastructures that are planned in the country
(e.g., Nam Theun 2 or the Theun-Hinboun project;
see Hirsch [2001]; Pahlman [2000]). The fact that
NGOs are not allowed in Laos also gives a
measure of the limits within which civil society is
allowed to participate. According to Khamhung
(2001), the rationale for the policy to transfer
ownership and associated costs of irrigation to
farmer users is based on the belief that
“traditional irrigation systems have been efficiently
managed by farmers’ communities” and also on
the economic necessity for the government to
reduce agriculture-sector subsidies. The 1998
Prime Minister’s Order No. 26/PM on transferring
irrigation projects to community organizations
aims at “promoting and supporting the role and
responsibility of WUAs in the management of
irrigation systems; assisting in the reduction of
the responsibilities of government agencies in the
routine management of irrigation systems;
ensuring the smooth transition of the full transfer
of ownership of all irrigation infrastructure to
WUAs; and improving the efficiency of
operations, management and water distribution on
all irrigation systems” (Khamhung 2001).
In Thailand, the ideology of accountability and
participation finds some common ground with that
of self-reliance, cooperation and participation co-
opted by governmental (in line with the 1997
constitution) and academic circles, as well as
with the rhetoric of the NGOs on grassroots
democracy and community-centered development
(Rigg 1991). It is thus little contested but the
underlying conceptual understanding or
assumptions of the different actors are often at
variance.
Molle et al. (2002) have reviewed the Thai
experience with Water User Groups (WUGs) and
Water User Associations (WUAs) in large-scale
public schemes and identified several reasons for
their repeated failure. Most reforms focused at
the tertiary level because irrigation agencies
usually have little interest in what is occurring
beyond the tertiary turnout. When supply at the
tertiary level generally depends on allocation and
distribution at higher levels in the system and
cannot be made predictable, farmers soon
discover that there is nothing to be managed and
the WUGs become apathetic. Organizational
needs of water management have also been
radically changed due to the introduction of direct
seeding in lieu of transplanting, the development
of secondary water sources and the spread of
pumps. This has weakened the exigency for
coordinated actions and given free ride to
individual strategies.31 Likewise, the necessity of
31However, there are exceptions to this rule: Pump irrigation projects, for example, have a stronger cooperative organization because
of the need to collect money for their own electricity costs and also to pay for the water supervisor, who operates and allocates water
(Chaiwat 2005). Molle et al. (2001) provide other examples of collective action in large-scale irrigation schemes.
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organizing collective work parties or of collecting
funds for maintenance has been undermined by
the use of funds available at the village and
tambon level.32
Rather than issues of O&M at the tertiary
level, the problem that has gained prominence in
a context of water scarcity is the allocation of
water in the dry season. The definition of
(seasonal) entitlements, in which users have a
say (as a first step to defining water rights), is
the preliminary step to the definition of service
agreements. Such agreements must be
accompanied by a technical capacity to
operationalize them, to monitor distribution and
to assess whether the actual and the agreed
supply match. This, again, has technical,
managerial, legal and political implications that
need combined support from the government,
the political class and society, which are
currently overlooked (Facon 2002; Molle
2004).33
Stressing both the importance of community
involvement and their poor responsiveness,
officials are caught up in the contradiction
inherent in the neo-populist discourse of
“empowerment,” which comes with both an
interventionist thrust (behind awareness-raising or
“educating villagers”) and a priority allegedly given
to local knowledge and participation (Long and
Villarreal 1996). Attempts at joint management of
natural resources (Heyd and Neef 2004) or to
institute Participatory Irrigation Management are
still perceived locally as state-initiated and state-
oriented,34 without real benefit to the farmers in
terms of improved access to water.35 The
contradiction between the decentralization rhetoric
and the very nature of the Thai bureaucracy
prompted Rigg (1991) to state that “a truly
decentralized, grass-roots development approach
comes into conflict with bureaucratic methods
and Thai society”.
More generally, in the whole region, the
rhetoric of participation in official discourses and
the prevailing cultural representations of farmer/
official relationships are often at odds. This can
be clearly sensed during workshops and
seminars, where officials are given the
opportunity to express their viewpoints: “UNDP,
UNEP, MRC, ADB, everyone who cares about
environmental sustainability is a stakeholder,
even the people themselves are stakeholders” (a
Cambodian official);36 “you have to make people
understand your will” (a Thai RID official); during
a workshop on water policy in Sri Lanka an
official leading a pilot RBO initiative declared that
no NGOs were selected “because they are not
aware of the present situation,” while the
administration was reported “to show good
interest” (Molle 2004).37 These and many other
declarations reveal deeply ingrained conceptions
that are often at loggerheads with the intended
activity and cannot be uprooted overnight.
32This will be accentuated with the Tambon Administrative Offices (TAOs) getting more funds as part of the decentralization process.
33One of the main weaknesses of the water policy under the ASPL was to overlook the difficulty to establish service agreements in
schemes that often have little control on both the availability of water and distribution.
34This can be seen in the use of the term “phi liang” (phi is elder, liang is to feed or, by extension, to raise; the meaning here is mentor
or counselor) applied to RID with regard to its establishment of WUGs. Interestingly, this word is used by both RID officials and
farmers.concrete actions for an indeterminate period of time. China’s laws, too, leave application modalities to be defined by ulterior
decrees.
35The successive efforts to establish and strengthen WUOs have not only been unsuccessful and wasteful in terms of budget and
energy but also contributed to the spread of mistrust and a lack of interest regarding state-initiated groups. This is reinforced by the
tendency of the Thai government to pile up state-supported groups for various activities—rice banks, buffalo banks, fishing groups,
cooperatives, peer groups for credit, cooperative shops, cottage industry groups—even though most groups appear to be apathetic
(Molle 2003).
36Southeast Asia Water Forum, Chiang Mai, December 2003, emphasis added.
37Likewise, in Tanzania, an official asserted: “we take the best decisions possible and the people help us in implementing them. This
contribution is the way for them to participate” (Geheb 2003).
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IWRM and River Basin Management
IWRM and river basin management are definitely
ubiquitous attributes of a “modern” water policy.
They have received wide and consensual support
from all quarters and feature prominently in all
legislations. The underpinning of these concepts
lies in the recognition that basin-wide interactions
between upstream and downstream, surface water
and groundwater, quality and quantity, and among
uses and users, require integrated and systemic
approaches to water management, as opposed to
the sectoral and fragmented approaches followed
in the recent past.
In Cambodia, the four priorities listed by
MOWRAM include the establishment of a pilot
RBO for the Prek Thnot river basin, which
includes Phnom Penh. As for now, no activity is
reported and the objectives and targets set up
remain very general (Tara et al. 2003).38 Myanmar,
as part of its recent attempt to define a national
Water Vision has targeted the Sittoung river basin
(Ti and Facon 2004). Likewise, in Laos, the Nam
Ngum river basin (NNRB) has been selected39 as
the first river basin to demonstrate the usefulness
of IWRM approaches, because of the existing
and planned water-sector investments as well as
its proximity to the capital, Vientiane (ADB 2004).
The National Water Vision for Laos
(Phonechaleun et al. 2002) stresses not only the
participatory nature of the RBO but also that
management is under the control of the
government. It stipulates that “the river basin
organization must ensure that the local authority
and community are appropriately involved and
must report periodically on the status of the water
and water resources to the Prime Minister’s
Office to ensure efficient management of water
and water resources”.
In Thailand, the Seventh National Plan (1992–
1996) provided strong incentive to the
development of guidelines for water resources
management in all 25 basins of Thailand
(Sethaputra et al. 2001). This appears to be a
desirable policy, especially in the basins where
intra and inter-sectoral competition for water is
highest. Basin studies, with detailed analyses of
existing resources, uses, and problems were
carried out for each of the 25 basins during the
period of this plan. These studies were followed
by a policy to gradually establish RBOs in these
25 main basins, the task of setting them up being
incumbent upon the ONWRC. Farmers were
grossly underrepresented in the earlier eight pilot
RBOs40 but the ONWRC (now the Department of
Water Resource) has worked to correct this
imbalance. Three pilot RBOs that had received
early support from the World Bank (Pasak river)
and from the ADB (upper-Ping and lower-Ping
rivers) are showing some interesting evolution
(Ankularmphai 2004). From an early composition
heavily biased towards administrative
representation, some RBOs have now been
divided into subbasin committees, which choose/
elect representatives at the village level, with
further cooption of some of these representatives
at the subdistrict, subbasin and basin levels
successively.
However, the lack of political and institutional
support, with no formalization or recognition by
law of their roles and power, is likely to affect
these RBOs in the very same way they affected
both the ONWRC (“upstream” of them) and the
WUGs (“downstream”). The odds are high that
38Or sometimes utterly unrealistic: “Increasing water production two times in five years,” “Decreased conflict in the river basin in two
years” (Tara et al. 2003).
39An integrated river basin management and development plan (IRBP) is to be developed for those subbasins of the Mekong river
and subbasins of other rivers, which are important for socioeconomic development plans at the national and local level, or which have
a high potential for water use conflicts (Phonechaleun et al. 2002).
40The RBOs of the upper and lower Ping rivers, for example, had only two farmer representatives each, compared with 20 officials.
The 1997 (unofficial) draft Water Law stipulates that the RBO should include “no more than 21 persons in total. They may be the
government officials or the official of the government enterprises or the qualified persons who have achievements, experience pertaining
to the state water resources. The appointment should have selected a certain number of officials in the field of water resources”.
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these proto-RBOs will remain paper organizations
with limited power and a consultative role rather
than strong participants in arenas of negotiation
and decision making.
It is also interesting to note how well the
rhetoric of IWRM has been seized by consultant
firms. Two consultants, for example, recently
(2003) drew a Master Plan for the Ping river on
behalf of the MNRE and claimed that “it was the
first time basin management and integrated plans
for water resources management were applied to
solve the problems of drought, flood and water
quality”. An integrated plan would be to establish
both structural and nonstructural measures but
while both are comparable in numbers the budget
planned for the former ends up being only 1.3
percent of the total. Problems are to be
“mitigated” by the implementation of both basin-
level and local measures: numerous meetings
with communities were used to produce a list of
5,056 desirable investments (mostly for domestic
supply) “requested” by local people. These claims
of a largely participative process are used to
enhance the plan’s legitimacy but there is no
mention of discussions/dissent about any of the
large-scale plans envisaged, which seems to
have been removed from debate.41 The plan
proposes investments over 20 years for a total
amount of roughly US$2 billion, of which 1.2 is
for the “Bhumipol reservoir inflow augmentation
project,” which would divert 3.77 Bm3 from the
Salaween river basin into the dam. While the plan
is comprehensive in its identification of possible
measures, it is hard to see in what it is
“integrated” or what it differs from earlier
bureaucratic water- resource development
planning.
A very similar approach has been deployed in
the Thepha-Nathavee basin, in the south of
Thailand. There the consultants played the role of
middlemen between, on the one hand, a
Provincial Working Group composed of high-level
representatives of all the authorities concerned
and, on the other, subdistricts and local
communities, with no direct interaction between
the two groups (Chupisanya 2003). There, also,
participation was measured by the large number
of meetings held with local people to request
them to examine problems, suggest solutions and
apply for actions further listed as “projects”. The
surprising part of the exercise is that a planned
total budget of 4.3 billion baht for 34 projects (27
of which are to be implemented within the next 20
years) has seemingly been approved, without
looking at how benefits compare to costs.42
China’s 2002 law (CIECN 2004) stipulates
that the “state shall, with respect to water
resources, adopt a system that organizes the
administration by watersheds as well as by
administrative areas” and that comprehensive
watershed plans43 will be “formulated by the
Department of Water Administration under the
State Council”. The functions of river-basin
management focus on data collection, planning
and interprovincial management on the key rivers.
The Ministry of Water Resources retains a central
role through its provincial departments but no role
is granted to other stakeholders44 in the possible
negotiations for water allocation or development
plans. Shen (2004) believes that the law is “a
41The report refers to “public participation in sharing ideas and preparing local plans”. It states in an odd manner that “Most people
know that the Ping river basin plan has been prepared, and as a result they support the plans”. The plan is divided into “local level”
and “basin level” actions and the document suggests that only local problems, solutions and actions are discussed with local people.
Such a device allows the removing of larger projects from the debate.
42As in the Ping case, the report claims that in contrast to earlier “top-down” planning approaches, “it was the first time that RID had
decided to try an opposite direction, i.e., adopting a “bottom-up” approach, with a “comprehensive public participation process”.
43“The ‘comprehensive plans’… shall refer to the overall arrangements, formulated according to the needs of economic and social
development and the present situation of the development and utilization of water resources, for the development, utilization, preservation
and protection of water resources, as well as for the prevention and control of water disasters” (CIECN 2004).
44A section under the title “Promote public participation” in another official document (WWC and CMWR 2003) states that the “Chinese
Government has paid great attention to the propaganda and education of sustainable development” and gives examples of academics
taking part in studies and technicians going to the countryside to promote efficient water utilization and its sustainable utilization as
examples of public participation.
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milestone” but that its application is likely to face
several problems, notably the equilibrium between
river- basin management and jurisdictional
management, the lack of integration between
water quality and water quantity, unclear
separation of the functions of the regulator,
manager and provider, and a low degree of
participation.
Vietnam enshrined river-basin management in
its 1999 water law. In 2001, it started to build up
RBOs for the Red, Dong Nai and Mekong (delta)
river basins (Wright 1999). As mentioned earlier,
RBOs “must fit in the country administrative
system” (Phan 2003). For the government, there
is no question that official bodies, in particular at
the local level, like districts, communes and
People’s Committees, do adequately represent
the people, their needs and interests. The River
Basin Planning Management Boards (RBOs in
short) are seen as coordination institutions
between different administrative scales/levels
made necessary by the fact that river basins do
cut across provinces and that interaction through
the hydrological cycle requires management at an
upper level (Phan 2003). They are established
with the duty to “advise the Minister of MARD on
planning and development projects, management
mechanism, policies and on other issues relating
to management, exploitation, utilization and
protection of watercourses in the river basin,” and
to “submit proposals” to the Ministry. It is mainly
conceived as a coordinating body between
“ministries, state agencies and People’s
Committee of centrally-governed municipalities
and provinces within the river basin” with, in
particular, the duty to request the necessary
information that will allow decisions to be taken
centrally. In addition, a General Office has been
established to coordinate RBO offices under
MARD (Su et al. 2004).
The Cuu Long RBO, for example (Mekong
delta), supported by AUSAID, is focusing its work
on gathering data and improving cooperation and
integrated planning/management over the 12
provinces concerned (Cantor 2003). That it is part
and parcel of the administration is strikingly
illustrated by the fact that “the standing members
of the RBO have been selected almost
exclusively from Central Government Agencies
based in Hanoi, more than 1,000 km from the
delta, with non-voting representation from the
provinces” (Cantor 2003). The need for
coordination between provinces has become
crucial to address the combined impact of land
and water development on the river flow in the
dry season (and resulting salinity intrusion
threats).45 The Red river RBO was supported by
the ADB. A first phase (1999–2001) focused on
data collection, design of a basin profile,
monitoring changes in land and water use, and
increasing communication and coordination
between agencies.46 The initiative also had to
face “little [existing] communication and joint
effort between the line agencies” as well as
between provinces (Wright 1999). The
achievements of the RBO are therefore still
limited and it is faced with a comprehensive list
of challenges (Sach 2004).
45The closure of the delta, the reclamation of the Plain of Reeds and the transformation of the traditional floating rice area all entail
growing water abstraction and depletion in the dry season. The different provinces are busy widening their canals in order to ease the
inflow from the Bassac or the Mekong river, without considering the resulting cumulative impact on the flow at the mouth of the river
arms. Modeling shows that, in dry years, salinity will intrude into the main branches of the Mekong, and laterally into the ungated
waterways, endangering agriculture, notably fruit cultivation (Can Tho University and IRD 2001; see also Miller 2001). The evolution of
the hydrograph of the Mekong river at its entrance point in Vietnam as a result of ongoing dam development in upper reaches of the
river will be paramount in defining what is possible to achieve and what is not; it is widely expected, however, that interseasonal
regulation will be improved, thus benefiting the delta in the dry season (Adamson 2001).
46Wright (1999) emphasizes the benefits expected from the RBOs as follows: “A major feature of the proposed RRBO [Red River Basin
Organization] is that it will provide a forum for all major stakeholders (including those representing irrigation interests) to discuss,
negotiate and agree upon recommendations for planning decisions to be submitted to the government. Although the Water Resources
Law makes it clear that the RRBO will not have ‘state management functions’ (to use the Vietnamese terminology), it will have a major
influence on the water resource management of the basin. Accordingly, irrigators will have an increased say in planning decisions,
which impact on their sub-sector under the proposed arrangements.”
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The Vietnamese case well illustrates the
dialectic of basin governance that, on the one
hand, demands decentralization/participation, and
where, on the other, integrated management also
requires a degree of recentralization of decisions
and command, or at least some high-level
coordination. It is recognized that empowerment
of local authorities in the 80s has produced a
fragmentation of water planning and management
that created negative impacts (Wright 1999;
Cantor 2003). Each province operates with a
strong local perspective both in terms of
management and planning of future works. The
administrative structure is very hierarchical and
provincial services are linked to MARD. As
reported by Wright “any major issue affecting
more than one province becomes a sensitive
issue within MARD and is usually handled by
separate discussion with each province”. As
some shortcomings of this fragmentation
gradually appear, the RBOs might be seen as the
place for the central government to reassert its
authority regarding issues that eventually prove to
transcend local boundaries, or to special interest-
groups to promote narrow-focus development
(Barrow 1998).
The way consultant firms or bureaucracies
seem to ride the wave of IWRM supports Biswas’
(2004) claims that “because of the current
popularity of the concept, some people have
continued to do what they were doing in the past,
but under the currently fashionable label of IWRM
in order to attract additional funds, or to obtain
greater national and international acceptance and
visibility”. Likewise Jonch-Clausen and Fugl
(2001) fear that IWRM may have “degenerated
into one of these buzzwords that everybody uses
but that means many different things to different
people”. Just like participation, IWRM appears as
something desirable and uncontroversial and
official documents can resort to it abundantly and
at “no cost”.47
IWRM remains an attractive and consensual
concept but its implementation necessarily means
a redistribution of power, a change in the mind-
set, and capacity building which, in practice, can
be but slow processes. As Biswas (2004) noted,
“In the real world, integrated water resources
management, even in a limited sense, becomes
difficult to achieve because of extensive turf
wars, bureaucratic infighting, and legal regimes
(like national constitutions)...” In addition, one
may wonder whether RBOs make sense in basins
where competition over water is limited, storage
capacity negligible/limited, or where both state
regulation capacity and involvement of the civil
society are weak. Instead of trying to cover all 25
basins in the country, Thailand might rather put
her efforts on three or four basins with clear
competition and allocation problems.
National Policies, the Management of
the Mekong River and Other
International Issues
The Mekong river itself remains surprisingly
pristine and undammed in its lower course,
despite grand plans drawn up in the 1960s and
1970s to transform the basin into a sort of
Tennessee Valley Authority. This can be partly
ascribed to the difficulty of building reservoirs
along the course of the river and also to the
political instability of the region during the past
four decades (Radosevich and Olson 1999;
Kaosa-ard and Dore 2003).
National policies and development of water
resources in the many tributaries of the river
directly affect the flow in the Mekong, in terms of
timing, quantity and quality. So far, interventions
in the Chinese part of the basin have been limited
but this has now changed with the construction of
four dams (out of a total of eight reservoirs
planned) (Dore and Yu Xiaogang 2004).
47See for example a document on Laos: “The immediate objective of the Water Sector is to foster and institutionalize the IWRM
approach in the mainstream planning process of the Government both at the central as well as at the provincial level” (Anonymous
2004a).
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Forthcoming impacts of the Chinese dams are
still unclear but opinions vary from alarmism
(TERRA 2002) to relative confidence that
sustained dry-season flows will benefit the basin
(Adamson 2001; Ringler et al. 2004). However,
the main impact of a change in the hydrological
regime (especially from the daily fluctuations in
dam releases following electricity requirements),
is likely to be on fisheries, since several species
have reproduction cycles attuned to the current
water regime and the size of the fishery is
directly related to the size of the flood. While
Laos has only one major dam (Nam Ngum),
Thailand has intensively developed its tributaries
on the Khorat plateau (Lohman 1998) and has
carried out studies on the possibility to divert
significant parts of the Kok river, in Chiang Rai
province, before it reaches the Mekong, as well
as some Mekong tributaries located in Laos (by
siphon under the river). Vietnam is also moving
ahead with an aggressive hydropower
development plan.
Potential for conflict from further direct
abstraction from the Mekong or excessive use
of its tributary streams is therefore high
(Öjendal 2000), but efforts by the Mekong
River Commission (MRC) have so far
contributed to staving off divisive actions
(Frederiksen 1998). In 1995, after 3 years of
intense negotiations, the “Mekong River
Agreement”48 was signed by the riparian
countries (except China and Myanmar). The
focus of the agreement is on “reasonable and
equitable utilization” and “prevention and
cessation of harmful effects” (with concern for
environmental protection, ecological balance,
pollution, fisheries, etc.). The touchiest section
of the agreement is article 5, which constrains
diversions from the main stream and from
tributaries (Radosevich and Olson 1999).49
Analysis of the agreement and consequences
for riparian states are beyond the scope of this
report. What needs to be noted here is that
development of dams and diversions in each
country are, in theory, constrained. Although
the recent events50 in the Se San river
(Vietnam/Cambodia) (Hirsch and Wyatt 2004;
Öjendal et al. 2002) bode ill for the future,
there are signs that the agreement acts as a
deterrent to transbasin initiatives in Thailand.
48or “Agreement on the cooperation for the sustainable development of the Mekong river basin.”
49 A. On tributaries of the Mekong river, including Tonle Sap, intra-basin uses and interbasin diversions shall be subject to notification
to the Joint Committee.
B. On the mainstream of the Mekong river:
1. During the wet season:
a) Intra-basin use shall be subject to notification to the Joint Committee.
b) Interbasin diversion shall be subject to prior consultation, which aims at arriving at an agreement by the Joint Committee.
2. During the dry season:
a) Intra-basin use shall be subject to prior consultation, which aims at arriving at an agreement by the Joint Committee.
b) Any interbasin diversion project shall be agreed upon by the Joint Committee through a specific agreement for each
project prior to any proposed diversion. However, should there be a surplus quantity of water available in excess of the
proposed uses of all parties in any dry season, verified and unanimously confirmed as such by the Joint Committee, an
interbasin diversion of the surplus could be made subject to prior consultation.
50Management of dams in Vietnam resulted in human death and severe damage in downstream areas located in Cambodia.
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This brief review of policies in the water and
irrigation sectors of the Mekong countries has
yielded a number of both commonalities and
discrepancies. It is apparent that the different
countries are at different levels of water
resources development. Laos and Cambodia are
still at an early phase of infrastructural
development and face the challenge of adopting
better and more inclusive decision-making
processes than their neighbors were able to
devise. Thailand and China have already
significantly developed dams and irrigation
schemes and are expected to move towards
improved and more environmentally sensitive
management. Vietnam and, probably, Myanmar
stand somewhere in the middle and still have
extensive plans to develop hydropower. Here,
participatory decision making and willingness to
manage water with a view on other uses need to
be strengthened.
A Global Toolbox?
The development and evolution of water policies
in all these countries51 also bear, at least
superficially, a number of similar features. They
embody, tentatively or permanently, formally or
informally, several traits that are part of the global
“toolbox” of what is being promoted as “best
practices,” “internationally recognized principles,”
or “modern management”. The hegemony and
popularity of such principles, according to Biswas
(2004), have something to do with their
vagueness. “Integrated,” “participatory,”
“decentralized,” “pro-poor,” “transparent” or
“accountable” practices signal a “brave new world”
and are at a certain level consensual, but their
reification into a set of standard policy
prescriptions may stymie or preclude the search
for more flexible, adapted and negotiated
outcomes.
The apparent uniformity of these water
institutions partly stems from their promotion by
bilateral and multilateral agencies, and also
through mainstream literature and international
conferences (Merrett 2003), or through influential
NGOs such as WWF or IUCN. On the one hand,
ADB discards the one-size-fits-all approach and
acknowledges that “there is no standard approach
that fits all the needs” (Arriens 2004) and on the
other, it proposes a quite unambiguous model of
water regime, whereby “modern” water legislations
are enacted, the state is confined to a regulatory
role decentralized down to RBOs, while irrigation
and urban waters “services” are assured by
providers and utilities, duly paid by their clients in
order to ensure full cost-recovery (Arriens 2004).52
Irrespective of the merits or limitations of such a
water regime, this approach tends to “freeze” the
range of arrangements and site-specific mix of
communities, state and private management that
are precisely what needs to be defined
endogenously.
Mainstream approaches fostered by
development banks or international agencies/think
tanks and aimed at disseminating “best
practices,” organizing regional seminars and
cross-country field visits do have positive
aspects. They enable the formation of a wider
community of water decision makers who may
learn from each other by putting their own context
into perspective; they allow the diffusion of
general principles and the identification of
51To a lesser degree in Myanmar because of its particular political situation.
52The World Bank pursues a similar approach. Saleth and Dinar (2000b), for example, review water reform processes in 11 countries
and extract for each of them what they consider as “best practices,” or “healthy practices that can strengthen the institutional basis for
better water allocation, financing, and management;” these include IMT, the formation of RBOs, water permit registry, market-based
water allocation, privatization of urban water supply, water law, etc. These practices are presented as elements whose achievement is
a measure of success and modernism, but their relevance (or lack thereof) to a particular context is not discussed. In the old way of
Rostow’s “take-off” and need for underdeveloped countries to “catch-up,” water rights in Chile and Australia show that they are in “an
advanced, though not yet an ideal, stage of institutional evolution”.
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common problems and solutions at a generic
level; they offer support/expertise and foster
national processes of reflection on policies and
the establishment of priorities; they sometimes
elicit dialogues between segments of the
administration or ministries that share
responsibilities on water issues but do not
coordinate their actions.
But policies are often top-down prescriptions
consisting in identifying “lacks” and failures and
then “providing” what has been identified as
missing. Rehabilitation programs look for a
“technical fix,” PIM policies or administrative
reforms for an “institutional fix,” and new laws and
regulation for a “legal fix”. All these approaches
include a good deal of naive social engineering
that purges social processes of their political
dimensions. Wright (1999), for example, believes
that in Vietnam “inter-province problems… would
benefit a great deal if there was a basin wide
forum to discuss and resolve, where all
stakeholders are seen as equal partners,”
overlooking the hierarchical and political nature of
regional development. Likewise ADB’s policy is
presented as being “essentially about improving
water governance”… for the reason that “making
right decisions lies at the heart of good
governance” (Arriens 2004, emphasis added). It is
implicit that “right” refers to the set of normative
elements mentioned earlier rather than to a value-
laden process of negotiation from which socially
sanctioned solutions could emerge.
A corollary of the standard policy toolbox
approach is that changes are evaluated based on
the formal existence of particular administrative
devices or institutions, without looking too much
at contents and processes. This is reinforced by
the requirement for development banks and
project managers to “measure” the impact of their
interventions.53 They thus run the risk of finding
themselves in the situation where the success of
participative programs is supposedly assessed by
the number of WUGs or RBOs set up (by the
government), or by the number of meetings held
with “stakeholders”. It is obvious that the mere
formation of an RBO does not ensure integrated
management (Schlager and Blomquist 2000) nor
does a water law reorder a water regime by itself
(Shah et al. 2001). As Jasper (2001) noted with
regard to the situation in Zimbabwe, it is
becoming “painstakingly apparent that it takes
more than good legislation to guarantee a change
for the better”.54 Many formal institutions are a
priori neither necessary nor sufficient.
All in all, it might take some degree of self-
deception to think that RBOs in Vietnam will
allow “full representation of all stakeholders,” that
Laos (Pheddara 2003), or MOWRAM in
Cambodia, will be able to register (and tax) water
users and grant permits, or that applying licenses
and water use fees will “increase efficiency of
water use”. Such convictions largely overestimate
the capacity of the states to reorder the water
regime. The common overemphasis on state
power is a reflection of the conception of
development as the introduction of packages
consisting of “various mixtures of expertise,
capital, technology, and effective modes of
organization” (Long and van der Ploeg 1989)
conveyed through expert knowledge (Arce and
Long 2000).
Transposition of Experiences and
Mind-Sets
The question of the transposition of experiences
from one setting to the other is central to
53A graphic example of this is provided by a “progress report” on water sector reforms in Asia (Mosley 2004), which establishes a list of
41 “policy elements” and estimates to which degree different countries have achieved them. These elements include “legislation
adopted,” “private sector investments,” “cost recovery,” “river basins/aquifer organization,” “rights and responsibilities of stakeholders,”
etc. See a similar approach towards overall assessment of the “health” of water institutions in Saleth 1999 and Saleth and Dinar
2000a.
54The 2002 draft water policy for Cambodia states: “A Law on Water Resources Management will soon be adopted by the national
assembly. After it has been promulgated, water management, water allocation, investment, water use, and water resource development
will be effective and sustainable, with MOWRAM having the responsibility for enforcement” (KOC 2002).
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development theory and practice.55 Are “success
stories,” “best practices,” or “promising
technologies” readily transferable to other
contexts? Many analysts observe that the water
sector appears to be largely littered with well-
intentioned and rationalistic reforms that have
failed to fully appraise the context of their
implementation (Sampath 1992; Molle 2001;
Pigram 2001; Shah et al. 2001). This raises two
questions: is a particular reform element sound or
indeed relevant in a particular context?56 And can
this element be readily introduced by a voluntary
and formal administrative fiat? In other words,
even if a particular policy is likely to bring
benefits, has its introduction any chance of
success within the particular political-economic
context? For example, it is not superfluous to ask
whether the enactment of certain laws is so
pressing when there is no accompanying existing
enforcement capacity, or whether IWRM principles
and basin management are so crucial in countries
like Laos and Cambodia, which hardly divert 1
percent of their water. Likewise, does the mere
setting up of apex bodies or RBOs ensure that
they are of any use? In Sri Lanka, a Water
Resource Board was established as early as
1964 to promote IWRM, river basins and trans-
basin development, and to tackle pollution.
However, it could never fulfill such ambitious
tasks and eventually confined itself to
hydrogeological studies and tube-well drilling
(Shah et al. 2001). There are many examples in
the world of RBOs established without support,
power, or funding, which quickly degenerated or
disappeared (Dourojeanni 2004).
It is interesting to note that reforms prompted
by outsiders are never literally implemented but
rather “absorbed” and always “digested” in some
way. Laws that include general principles always
need application decrees that remain largely at
the discretion of concerned ministries;
conditionalities set by the multilateral banks are
often watered down into pilot projects which
evaporate with the next government or policy
change; the transit through different governmental
spheres may allow draft laws (once translated
into local language) to be aptly modified before
they are voted; participatory reforms are steered
off course by peculiar conceptions of bureaucratic
top-down “participatory” interventions; the rhetoric
of IWRM is hijacked by line agencies
repositioning themselves within the new discourse
and by consultant firms proposing conventional
structural projects under the disguise of “people’s
request” or integrated approaches.
All in all, two opposite attitudes seem
possible:
• One may simply dismiss attempts to set
RBOs in contexts that are arguably unfit, and
sometimes adverse, or legislation/reforms
that seem overambitious and are unlikely to
be put in practice. This leapfrogging
syndrome often leads to failed and untimely
policy reforms and make further attempts
more difficult (Shah et al. 2001).57 As Thomas
and Grindle (1990) noted, with regard to
economic and political reorganizations,
“Reforms have been attempted when the
administrative or political resources to
implement them did not exist. The result has
generally been misallocated resources,
wasted political capital, and frustration”.
• But one may also adopt a more optimistic
stance, whereby RBOs, apex bodies, cost-
sharing arrangements, etc., are considered as
practices sanctioned by international
experience, and push for the adoption of such
measures. The implicit assumption is that
they are necessary, if not sufficient,
55There has been, for example, a flourishing literature on the conditions and possibility to transfer Australian experience to other
regions of the world, notably to the Mekong river basin and Sri Lanka (Chenoweth 1999; Pigram 1999, 2001; Malano et al. 1999;
Birch et al. 1999).
56As Miller and Hirsch (2003) put it “the risk inherent in transfer is that consensus is assumed or even forced from above”.
57“Uncritical ‘copycat’ replication of successful institutional models—either by enthusiastic national governments or at the behest of
enthusiastic donors—is the sure formula for failure” (Shah et al. 2001).
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foundations58 towards a longer-term objective
of establishing IWRM, redefining line
agencies as service providers and water
users as clients, in self-financing and
sustainable arrangements. Initial
effectiveness of the measures taken may
often be limited or nil but there is confidence
that, with time, adjustments to local reality
lead to viable and adapted institutions. The
gradual evolution of RBOs in Thailand
(Ankularmphai 2004), or the recognition by
ADB that fully independent regulators may
not necessarily be the most effective (Arriens
2004), are examples of evolution by learning.
Both positions have their weaknesses.
Sticking to the former may lead to inaction
because settings are rarely easily amenable to
change; it denies the possibility to seize
opportunities or the necessity to adjust to
changes. Sticking to the latter, on the other hand,
may be tantamount to subscribing to the fallacy
that some blueprints and alleged “best practices”
can be easily transplanted, without burdening
oneself with a thorough analysis of each
situation. As pointed out by Evans (2003), with
regard to economic reforms, “institutional
monocropping” premised on the presumption that
“the most advanced countries have already
discovered the one best institutional blueprint and
that its applicability transcends national cultures
and circumstances” is a sure recipe for
frustration. What is important to acknowledge is
that none of the best practices promoted are
inherently good or bad. Beyond the formal nature
of a particular proposition, what counts is the
substance of the corresponding process. For
example, RBOs can be pivotal platforms for
representations of different users and values
about water, for information-sharing and
knowledge-building, and for decision making
about crucial issues of infrastructural
development or water allocation. But they can
also just as well be limited to consultative
meetings masquerading as participatory
processes, or be a handy way to sanction and
give legitimacy to business-as-usual strategies.
Likewise, WUGs or WUAs can serve as building
blocks for a nested level of democratic
representation in water- management decisions
but they can also be means to merely shift part
of the O&M costs from the state to users (or to
tambon administrations, in the case of Thailand).
The two logics are at work and the constant but
antagonistic shifts towards either genuine
participation and democratization, or institutional
reordering and capture by more powerful actors,
is ultimately a political struggle, or process,
shaped by many factors. This invites us to
somehow reconcile the two approaches by
looking for a middle path between prescription
and a wait-and-see attitude.
Instilling or Enabling Change
Whether reforms are about the design of a water
policy or water law, the establishment of basin or
catchment organizations or platforms, the
turnover of irrigation management to users, or the
financial sustainability of a domestic water supply
scheme, the main ingredients of these reforms
are various and generally conflicting values,
discourses and interests, which reflect the
diversity of the people having a stake in water
and the way they try to secure both personal and
common interests. The smaller the scale, the
more “wicked” the problems are: no omniscient
representative of the public interest, enlightened
planner, or expert-based model, will ensure an
optimal social outcome (Wester and Warner 2002;
Lachapelle et al. 2003; Clark 2002). Where
heterogeneities and uncertainties prevail,
“processes of mediation, bargaining, conflict and
power become key” dimensions of institution
building (Mehta et al. 2000).
58Wright (1999) refers to the “solid legislative framework provided by the recently passed Water Resources Law” (Vietnam).
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A decision that genuinely reflects a balancing
of interests and values can only be achieved
through a process whereby different stakeholders
get gradually empowered, a truly political process
that goes beyond formal reforms but which can
be partly enabled by them. Boelens and Doornbos
(2001) emphasize that “to strengthen local
normative systems in peasant irrigation, it is not
necessary to back or legitimize specific rules, but
rather to enhance the authority to make such
rules, involving all stakeholders”. Robust
arrangements combine (often lengthy) trust
building, confrontation of worldviews and social
learning, informed and supportive science, and
political space for the representation of all
stakeholders, and must allow for a degree of
“messiness and unpredictability” that is usually
not recognized in classical approaches to
Common Property Resource management
(Cleaver 2000).
A more inclusive and balanced
development path is, however, largely
contingent upon societal changes and
democratization, whose dynamics lie beyond
the scope of the sole water sector. The vision
of a shift from supply-oriented, paternalistic
development to process-oriented approaches
leading to “informed consent” (Delli Priscoli
2004), however attractive and desirable,
certainly remains on the far horizon rather than
something that can be conjured up by fiat or
mere good will. Deliberative development
enables a better definition of social choice but
can only develop in a political environment
whereby some “messiness” in the process of
choice is allowed and where a degree of
redistribution of existing power is made
possible (Evans 2003). Multi-stakeholder
dialogues are one way to “engage government,
business and civil society stakeholders in
processes of learning and negotiation that can
transcend the limitations of centrally controlled
and technically orientated bureaucratic decision
making on one extreme and ‘decisions’ made
by a ‘free market’” (Roling and Woodhill 2001).
In that sense, “check-box” approaches which
merely aim at establishing formal and static
structures or laws miss the crucial point that
institutional building is an evolutionary and
socially embedded process: human systems
must adapt not only because surrounding
ecosystems change but also because the actual
distribution of a resource is always contested and
generate conflicting claims that need to be
reconciled (Both Ends 2000; Miller and Hirsch
2003; Cleaver and Franks 2003).
The definition of more inclusive and equitable
governance patterns is also hampered by scale
constraints. Local communities and NGOs
emphasize the use of local and traditional
knowledge to address problems and this
knowledge and corresponding institutions are
often quite effective at a micro scale. However,
communities have rarely developed means to
address issues at a wider scale because there
was no such necessity and because they may
not have the understanding of environmental
changes occurring at a larger scale. They,
therefore, have difficulties to scale-up their
knowledge, organizations and interventions in a
context of growing hydrologic interconnectedness
across scales. To some extent, it can even be
stated that the principle of subsidiarity is
antagonistic to macro-level basin management.59
Conversely, state agencies have a better
understanding of macro-level constraints and
allocation, have access to more data and
technical tools, but struggle to understand the
heterogeneity and discontinuities, both physical
and human, of the real world, and have mixed
success in their application of ready-made
solutions. Their problem is scaling-down their
understanding and management practices (Roth
2004).
59Because of the need for integration and consistency, Van der Zaag (2004) acknowledges that “sometimes the principle of subsidiarity
implies that decisions should be made at the highest possible levels”.
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Emerging Governance Patterns and
Main Actors
What is the overall governance pattern emerging
from the ongoing development planning and water
policy reforms, and who are the main actors?
While a quite vibrant civil society has developed
in Thailand in the past 15 years (Hirsch 1995,
2001), and is now emerging in other Mekong
countries through the growth of NGOs (Dore
2003), grassroots movements and citizens as a
whole have yet to be involved in decision-making
processes. Advocacy groups have recorded a few
successes in their opposition to dams, for
example, but they tend to be considered by
governments more as an unavoidable nuisance
than as “partners in development” to be reckoned
with. Participation of “stakeholders” in meetings
related to water policy or the setting up of RBOs
has often remained cosmetic and largely been a
way to legitimize state action.
NGOs, local activists and academics have
generally adopted stances putting forward local
traditions, culture and knowledge, but these have
not been factored in policies (see Watershed
2001, for Thailand). These civil society
organizations are also not homogeneous.
Conservationists sometimes see the preservation
of nature or biodiversity as an objective, which
must take precedence over productive activities
of poor people. The debate between conservation
and production (e.g., protecting forests from
people vs. protecting forest by people, see
Johnson and Forsyth 2002; Sato 2003) is
persistent, although environmentalists have also
borrowed from the livelihood framework in order to
find compromises. Marked differences are also
apparent between NGOs, which systematically
oppose taxation of peasants, and organizations
like IUCN or WWF, which have largely bought into
the mainstream discourse of pricing and markets
as a way to regulate the use of natural resources.
ADB and other funding agencies have also
found difficulties navigating between their
borrowers/client states and organized advocacy
groups, despite unremitting calls for participation.
While willing to balance government power
through a more democratic process of decision
making, they fear that projects (and disbursement
of funds) may be paralyzed by uncompromising
NGOs. Current affairs provide signs that both
multilateral agencies and states are nevertheless,
willy-nilly, gradually moving towards a more
cautious approach to planning (Öjendal et al.
2002). However, traditional expert-driven
approaches to development problems and a
reluctance to engage in lengthy and uncertain
planning processes set a limit to the changes one
should expect.
If water policies owe a lot to mainstream
general concepts, one must also question the role
of national decision makers. Are these merely
passive receivers of concepts crafted in other
arenas? Is there a struggle between state
departments, schools of thought (e.g., big vs.
small projects), lines of thinking, or ideologies?
The material reviewed earlier does not allow us to
fathom policy-making processes in all these
dimensions but the general impression is that
disagreements are more related to political or
administrative in-fighting, struggle for power,
budget, or prerogatives than to differences in
vision. Yet, it is also apparent that each line
agency taken in isolation is not homogeneous.
Some segments favor the status quo and oppose
changes but others are open to reform and
sometimes champion them.
Most bureaucracies or line agencies have
difficulties in dealing with more deliberative or
participatory approaches. They feel threatened by
what they perceive as a loss of control, challenge
to their legitimacy, or denial of their competence
(Lachapelle et al. 2003; Wester and Warner
2002). It is apparent that officials tend to have a
Manichean view of NGOs, readily divided
between “good” ones (likely to be invited to
meetings) and “bad” ones (deemed too
confrontational). In some cases, like in Indonesia,
officials have formed their own NGOs, with the
aim of not only capturing part of the flow of
money channeled through the NGOs, but also to
be able to legitimate projects through their
mobilization as “civil society” voices (Suhardiman
2005). The limits of the participatory rhetoric are
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also apparent in the fact that large-scale projects
with massive potential impact on population and
the environment and are still being devised in
secrecy (e.g., the Thai “water grid” or the “River
interlinking” in India). Manufacturing consent
through the media is common practice but
imposing it is also commonplace.60
Research Issues
This review of the water sectors in the Mekong
region has unearthed more questions than
answers. Failed reforms have a cost not only in
terms of time and money but also in terms of lost
opportunity and distrust. Research should address
both theoretical issues (e.g., what governs
differences in policy responses to similar
challenges) and practical ones, providing insight
on what governs success and failure, and on
implementation, while emphasizing the need for
the contextualization of options (see Bery 1990).
Because of the centrality of water in many
activities and livelihoods, relevant research
questions on water governance in the Mekong
region span a large spectrum of issues. Those
more specifically related to irrigation and water
resources management, either on a general plane
or in relation to a particular project, could include
the following:
• What are the most pressing issues regarding
water and irrigation practices and policies,
and in which locale are these issues more
salient [establish spatial and thematic
priorities; do not apply policies across the
board]?
• What are the measures that can, realistically,
be successfully taken and enforced by the
state, given its current power and the
political-economic environment?
• What changes can be gradually instilled by a
bottom-up approach that creates a sense of
ownership and generates incentives through
clear benefits to the population concerned? At
the same time, what are the costs and
limitations of bottom-up approaches? Most
importantly, what avenues are there for a
multi-scalar approach, co-management and so
on that accommodate both state and civil
society interests and agendas?
• What is the scope for a “professionalization”
of line agencies? What incentives to
managers and officers can be designed?
• What are the intrinsic limitations of local
stakeholders (knowledge limited to local
scale, nonawareness of scalar interactions,
varied cohesiveness, etc.) and can leadership
and accountability be fostered?
• What can we learn from the ongoing
implementation of policies on the ground?
What scope is there to enhance social
learning, build trust and favor endogenous
processes?
• What is the underlying structure of power and
interests, within the bureaucracy, political
parties and other stakeholders, and what
bearing does this have on the options
available and possible outcomes? How can
this be rebalanced? And what is the nature of
bureaucratic competition within and between
state structures?
• Genesis of reform and ideas: what types of
knowledge and legitimacy are used, how do
these shape people’s perceptions of problems
(Livingston 2005), and to what degree can
experiences elsewhere be recontextualized?
• How can the support of external development
banks and agencies be made more efficient
60The Bangkok Post (2004, May 7) reports that “The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives asked the military to conduct ‘psychological
operations’ in Phrae’s Song district to pave the way for the construction of the Kaeng Sua Ten dam” and to “monitor the anti-dam
movement in tambon Sa-iab, the dam site.” The ministry also hired teachers from schools to promote the dam.
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and better blend support to both the
government and the civil society? How to
avoid ready-made “best practices” to crowd
out more endogenous responses? How to
reconcile the slow pace of sociopolitical
processes and the short time frames of state
or bank projects?
• How pressing was the need for such reforms
and how sound have been the steps taken?
To what degree (and why) have national
bureaucracies and ruling political parties
shared a concern for reordering the water
sector and added their willpower to the banks’
solicitations, and how does this vary from
country to country? How can we get beyond
the infamous “lack of political will”
explanation?
• What is the nature, and what are the
implications of private-sector involvement?
How are community and private conceived in
each case as alternatives to state roles?
In sum, water policy appears as a contested
domain where varied interests (e.g., financial or
political dividend of projects), values (e.g., local
development or large projects), and strategies to
access water conflict with one another. Two main
lines of tension have been identified. The first is
the conflict between water policies largely derived
from international references, presumed
internationally sanctioned practices and, on the
other hand, the need for a more endogenous
definition of priorities with emphasis placed on the
specifics of each locale. The second line of
tension is between the conventional top-down
mode of action of state agencies and the
general principle that puts the active
participation of concerned populations as the
point of departure for designing interventions
that are more efficient, fairer and less-prone to
externalities. Crafting or, rather, enabling
governance patterns for water management in
the Mekong region will be a journey towards
bridging these divides.
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